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I. INTRODUCTION

Over the last three decades, there have been significant increases in
labor force participation by women.' Initially, this increase was fueled
by the entry of single, childless women into the labor market. 2 Married
women primarily dedicated their efforts to home care concerns.
However, in recent years, a new trend has emerged as "the levels of
market work undertaken by married women have increased relative to
those of unmarried women." 3
Explanations for the increase in labor force participation of married
women are many and varied. Economic explanations often focus on
1. See generally Francine D. Blau & Marianne A. Ferber, Occupations and
Earningsof Women Workers, in WORKING WOMEN: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 37, 3741 (Karen Shallcross Koziara et al. eds., 1987) (describing changes in the sex
composition of professions in the 1970s).
2. See Ray Marshall & Beth Paulin, Employment and Earnings of Women:
Historical Perspective, in WORKING WOMEN: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 15 tbl.4

(Karen Shallcross Koziara et al. eds., 1987) (describing the marital status of women
workers before, during, and after World War II).
3. John H. Pencavel, The Market Work Behavior and Wages of Women: 19751994, 33 J. HUM. RESOURCES 771, 792 (1998) (describing the demographic changes that
have occurred in the composition of the U.S. labor force during the last several decades).
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trends in men and women's real earnings. During the 1970s and 1980s
there was a decline in men's real earnings.4 At the same time, women's
real earnings increased due to both larfger amounts of and higher returns
on their investments in human capital. Increased proportions of women
have attended and completed college and, upon graduation, have
pursued careers in traditionally male-dominated markets. 6
The combination of the countervailing trends in men's and women's
earnings, along with increases in the cost of living, have led to greater
dependence on women working in modem families, and thus have
increased the percentage of dual-earner families in the United States.!
Not surprisingly, these trends have been accompanied by an increase in
the "number of paired employees, defined as a husband and wife who
work for the same organization." 8 As noted elsewhere, the incidence of
romantic relationships at work, some of which may lead to marriage,
9
will likely increase as more women enter fields dominated by men.
The increase in married women's labor force participation and the
resulting increase in dual-earner families have had major public policy
implications. Employers have been required to establish new policies
regarding the employability of married and related individuals.
Legislatures have been asked to consider a whole new set of policies
intended to allow employees to respond to family responsibilities
without fear of losing their jobs.
While considerable attention has focused on family-friendly practices
4. See generally Annette Bernhardt et al., Women's Gains or Men's Losses? A
Closer Look at the Shrinking GenderGap in Earnings,101 AM. J.Soc. 302 (1995); June
O'Neill & Solomon Polachek, Why the Gender Gap in Wages Narrowedin the 1980s, 11
J.LAB. ECON. 205 (1993).
5. O'Neill & Polachek, supra note 4, at 225.
6. See Sharon K. Houseknecht & Graham B. Spanier, Marital Disruption and
HigherEducationAmong Women in the UnitedStates, 21 Soc. Q. 375, 375 (1980).
7. See Dian L. Seyler et al., Balancing Work and Family: The Role of EmployerSupported Child Care Benefits, 16 J. FAM. ISSUES 170 (1995). In 1980, there were
approximately twenty-two million dual-earner households comprising 46.4% of total
married households. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Household and
Family Characteristics:March 1980, CURRENT POPULATION REP., Ser. P-20, No. 366
(Sept. 1981), availableat http'J/www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubslp20-515u.pdf. By 1998, the
number of dual-earner households had increased to approximately twenty-nine million
(53% of total married couple households). U.S. Dep't of Commerce, supra,at 133.
8. James D. Werbel & David S. Hames, Are Two Birds in Hand Worth More than
One in the Bush: The Case of PairedEmployees, 2 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. REv. 318
(1992).
9. See Gary N. Powell & Sharon Foley, Something to Talk About: Romantic
Relationships in OrganizationalSettings, 24 J.MGMT. 421, 424 (1998).
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like family leave, little attention has been paid to other family-unfriendly
employment practices, such as the use of "antinepotism" or "no-spouse"
rules.1" These rules, under which restrictions are placed on the ability of
spouses or other family members to work together, either in the same
department or company, have long been common in the U.S. workplace,
and are notable because they run contrary to the current emphasis on
accommodating working families."
Legal challenges to no-spouse rules began to surface at a time when
women were first moving into what was primarily a male-dominated
workplace. Employees (both men and women) who had been affected
by the implementation of these rules sought relief in state and federal
courts, arguing that they had been discriminated against based on marital
status ("Marital Status Discrimination" or "MSD"). Challenges to
antinepotism and no-spouse rules occurred under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act' 2 or as constitutional challenges under the Due Process
Clause' 3 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. i4 These claimants confronted several obstacles. First,
while federal antidiscrimination law protected individuals against
discriminatory practices based on sex,' 5 "marital status" is not a
10. See Julius M. Steiner & Steven P. Steinberg, Caught Between Scylla and
Charybdis: Are Antinepotism Policies Benign Paternalismor Covert Discrimination?,
20 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 253, 254-56 (1994) (describing antinepotism rules). See
definitions of antinepotism and no-spouse rules discussed infra Part II.B.
11. See Terry Morehead Dworkin, It's My Life-Leave Me Alone: Off-the-Job
Employee Associational PrivacyRights, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 47, 56-63 (1997) (describing
the various state's statutes protecting marital status); H. Elizabeth Peters, The Role of
Child Care and ParentalLeave Policies in Supporting Family and Work Activities, in
GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE 280 (Francine D. Blau & Ronald G.
Ehrenberg eds., 1997) (describing the various policies adopted in the 1980s and 1990s to
facilitate women's participation in both work and family activities).
12. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Rath Packing Co., 787
F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that employer's no-spouse rule had a disparate impact
upon women and was not justified by business necessity); cf. Yuhas v. Libbey-OwensFord Co., 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that employer's no-spouse rule had a
disparate impact on women, but finding that employer's policy was job related and thus
not a violation of Title VII).
13. See, e.g., Wright v. Metrohealth Med. Ctr., 58 F.3d 1130 (6th Cir. 1995)
(holding that a public hospital's nepotism policy, which required transfer of one spouse
to a different unit upon marriage of co-workers, did not directly and substantially
interfere with fundamental right to marry and, thus, was subject only to rational basis
scrutiny).
14. See, e.g., Parsons v. County of Del Norte, 728 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding that county's no-nepotism rule, prohibiting spouses from working as permanent
employees in the same department, did not violate Equal Protection or Due Process
Clauses since it bore a rational relationship to county's interest in avoiding conflicts of
interest, favoritism in employee hiring, supervision, and allocation of duties).
15. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
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protected category. Second, in general, courts have been reluctant to
extend protection against sex discrimination to include discrimination on
the basis of the plaintiff's marital status. Third, even in jurisdictions
where marital status was a protected category, as occurs in many states,
courts adopted a narrow definition of the term, substantially limiting the
protection afforded to spouses.
As it became apparent that many employers were confronting problems
associated with the increased number of dual earning families, judges
and commentators recognized the need for guidance on this issue. For
example, judges confronting some of the first challenges to no-spouse6
rules noted that the actual effects of no-spouse rules were unclear.
Several commentators pointed to the fact that no-spouse rules, while
couched in sex-neutral terms, were likely to affect women more than
men.' 7 Unexplained, however, was why such rules were expected to
have a disparate impact on women and the actual dimensions of such a
negative impact.
Also, little was known about the nature and impact of state marital
status discrimination legislation. A review of state laws revealed sharp
differences in terms of the scope of protection afforded under such laws.
Some states adopted a "narrow" definition of marital status (referring
only to the condition of being married or not), while other states adopted
a "broad" definition (including not only the condition of being married,
but also the identity of the employee's spouse).
It has been over thirty years since the first MSD cases appeared on the
judicial landscape and close to twenty years since some of the major
legal scholarship in this area was produced. During that time, our
understanding of the implications of the demographic changes that
began in the late 1960s and early 1970s has improved due to new
research on the economics of family decisions regarding work, and more
experience has been gained regarding the application of existing
legislation to MSD claims. A reevaluation of the evidence and
experiences during the last thirty years could help provide a more
16. See, e.g., Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1510-11 (10th Cir.
1987) (finding against the plaintiff, but noting the lack of clear understanding on the
factors affecting employment decisions by married employees).
17. See Leonard Bierman & Cynthia D. Fisher, Antinepotism Rules Applied to
Spouses: Business and Legal Viewpoints, 35 LAB. L.J. 634, 637 (1984); Joan G. Wexler,
Husbands and Wives: The Uneasy Casefor Antinepotism Rules, 62 B.U. L. REv. 75, 79,
92 (1982); Comment, (Mrs.) Alice Doesn't Work Here Anymore: No-Spouse Rules and
the American Working Woman, 29 UCLA L. REV. 199, 201-02 (1981).
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informed understanding of the impact of antinepotism and no-spouse
rules on employment outcomes and of how the courts have dealt with
employee challenges to such employment practices.
We begin this analysis in Part I[ with a brief discussion of employment
policies that have been adopted to meet the unique needs of working
families. Interestingly, these practices often exist contemporaneously
with policies that restrict employment opportunities for dual-earner
couples, namely antinepotism and no-spouse rules.' 8 In Part III, we
present the results of our comprehensive analysis of case law in this area to
show the nature of legal challenges to antinepotism and no-spouse rules
and how they have been decided by the courts. In Part IV, we describe
the legislative framework under which MSD claims have been raised
and identify the various issues considered by courts in addressing these
complaints. In Part V, we identify and critique (1) the tendency of
courts to view antinepotism and no-spouse rules as sex neutral, and (2)
the concern that a liberal interpretation of MSD could interfere with the
ability of employers to effectively manage the workplace. Part VI
concludes the Article.
II. EMPLOYERS' RESPONSES TO WORK AND FAMILY
DEMANDS IN THE WORKPLACE

As often occurs in conjunction with demographic changes in the labor
force, the increase in dual-earner families affected the employment
practices of U.S. firms. In order to attract, motivate, and retain quality
employees, many employers adopted what might be termed familyfriendly policies. Nonetheless, the response of the business community
to dual-earner families has been varied, as other employers have either
failed to accommodate dual-earner families or have adopted policies that
actually harm them. In the following Sections we briefly review both
sets of policies.
A. Family-FriendlyEmployment Practices
A significant number of employers have adopted family-friendly
employment policies. Most popular in this group are policies that allow
employees to attend to the needs of family members in addition to their
own personal needs.' 9 Child-care benefits are probably the most
common.20 For example, in addition to basic forms of sick leave
18. See infra Part II.
19. See BURTON T. BEAM, JR. & JOHN J. MCFADDEN, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 402
(5th ed. 1998).
20. See Peters, supra note 11, at 280-81 (describing the various policies directed
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associated with the Family and Medical Leave Act,2 ' some organizations
offer family-oriented leave benefits to care for ill children both at home
and in the hospital.2 2 Organizations might also provide day care centers,
financial aid for outside child-care services, referral services for childcare facilities, on-site education for children, educational assistance for
children, and help with child adoptions. 23 In addition to policies
designed specifically for working parents, many firms provide
dependent care assistance plans, eldercare programs, spousal transfer
support, employee assistance plans, and wellness programs to all
members of an employee's family.24
Similarly, many organizations offer a variety of alternative work
arrangements that enable employees to attend to family and personal
needs, including flextime,25 telecommuting,2 6 permanent work-fromhome arrangements, 27 a compressed workweek, job sharing, and
permanent part-time work.
These programs represent a shift from
longer work hours to more productive work hours and recognition by
employers that various flextime options may help balance work and
family conflicts.
towards providing or subsidizing the cost of child care).
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
22. See David E. Gundersen et al., Family Supportive OrganizationalBenefits as
Influences on Entry Level Job Preferences: An Empirical Analysis Using a Policy

Capturing Methodology, BENEFITS Q., First Quarter 1995, at 58, 60; Jennifer J. Laabs,
Schools at Work, PERSONNEL J., Nov. 1991, at 72,76.
23. See Ellen Galinsky & Peter J. Stein, The Impact of Human Resource Policies
on Employees: Balancing Work/Family Life, 11 J. FAM. IssuEs 368, 372-77 (1990);

Gundersen et al., supra note 22, at 59; Laabs, supra note 22, at 72; Miriam B. Scott,
Work/Life ProgramsPromote Productivity, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REv., Sept. 1997,
at 22, availableat http:llwww.dbs.cdlib.orglmw/mwcgi.mb; Employer's Family Benefits
Attract Workers, EMPLOYEE BENEFrr PLAN REV., Mar. 1992, at 20, available at

http:llwww.dbs.cdlib.orglmw/mwcgi.mb.
Interestingly, despite their increased
popularity, recent literature has emphasized a "backlash" against family-friendly policies
related to child care. See Lisa Jenner, Family-FriendlyBacklash, MGMT. REV., May
1994, at 7, available at http:llwww.dbs.cdlib.orglmw/mwcgi.mb. Others "suggest that
family-friendly backlash may be more a media-sensationalized issue than a real one."
Teresa J. Rothausen et al., Family-FriendlyBacklash-Fact or Fiction? The Case of
Organizations' On-Site Child Care Centers, 51 PERSONNELPSYCHOL. 685, 701 (1998).
24. See BEAM & MCFADDEN, supra note 19, at 418-22; Scott, supra note 23, at

22-23.
25.

See Gundersen et al., supra note 22, at 59; Kim L. Sommer & Deborah Y.

Malins, Flexible Work Solutions, SMALL Bus. REP., Aug. 1991, at 29.
26. See Alan R. Earls, True Friends of the Family, COMPUTERWORLD , Feb. 17,

1997, at 83, 83-84.
27.

28.

Id.

See Scott, supra note 23, at 23.
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In total, these policies illustrate that the separation between family and
work, which was an essential component of the traditional workplace of
the first half of the last century, need no longer occur. Both employers
and employees recognize possible benefits associated with developing a
family-friendly atmosphere at work. 29 Employers have found familyfriendly benefits to improve employee recruitment, retention, job
satisfaction, productivity, and absenteeism rates. 30 Moreover, such
policies increase morale, reduce stress, and lead to greater organizational
commitment among employees and a competitive advantage within their
industry.3 1
B. Family-Unfriendly Employment Practices
Despite the increase in adoption of policies and benefits that are
family friendly and clearly meet the unique needs of dual-earner
households, many companies remain much less open to having both
members of a dual-earner family working at their organization. This is
clearly reflected in the continued popularity of antinepotism policies and
no-spouse rules, which prior research found present in over forty percent
of business organizations.3 2
Antinepotism policies limit the number of family members working
for an employer or the capacity in which family members work for an
employer. No-spouse rules, on the other hand, prohibit only spouses
from working for the same employer. Consider the following three
examples:
29. For example, a recent survey finds that 85% of men and women in dual career
households want flexible hours, 74% want family leave, 63% want a formal flexible
work program and 53% want company-supported child care, among others. See Robert
Bellinger, Dual-Career Couples Crave Flexible Hours and Jobs, ELECTRONIC
ENGINEERING TIMES, Oct. 5, 1998, at 121, 121. See generally Galinsky & Stein, supra
note 23, at 377-78.
30. See Tracey L. Honeycutt & Benson Rosen, Family Friendly Human Resource
Policies, Salary Levels, and Salient Identity as Predictorsof OrganizationalAttraction,
50 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 271, 274 (1997); V. K. Narayanan & Raghu Nath, A Field
Test of Some Attitudinal and Behavioral Consequences of Flexitime, 67 J. APPLIED
PSYCH. 214, 214 (1982); J.L. Pierce & J.W. Newstrom, The Design of Flexible Work
Schedules and Employee Responses: Relationships and Process, 4 J. OCCUPATIONAL
BEHAV. 247 (1983); Karol L. Rose, The Business Casefor FLEX, HRFoCus, Aug. 1998,
at S 1-S2.
31. See Steven L. Grover & Karen J. Crooker, Who Appreciates FamilyResponsive Human Resource Policies: The Impact of Family-FriendlyPolicies on the
OrganizationalAttachment of Parents and Non-Parents, 48 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 271,
271-72 (1995).
32. See Robert Ford & Frank McLaughlin, Nepotism: Boon or Bane, PERSONNEL
ADmIN., Nov. 1986, at 78, 80-81; James D. Werbel & David S. Hames, Antinepotism
Reconsidered: The Case of Husband and Wife Employment, 21 GROUP & ORG. MGMT.
365, 365-66 (1996).
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[1] Members of the immediate family, spouse, parent, child, of a present
33
employee are not to be considered for employment by [the employer].
[2] EMPLOYMENT OF RELATIVES-No husband and wife nor any relatives
(natural or through marriage) may work in the same restaurant. As
34 past
experience has proven, this causes undue strain on all parties concerned.
[3] It shall be the policy of the [employer] not to employ the combination of
husband and wife... where a conflict of interest could arise; said policy is to
apply to the following:
1. Administrator-Teacher relationship
2. Husband and Wife combination in the same building 3
3. All other situations where a conflict of interest occurs.

As illustrated by these examples, some antinepotism and no-spouse
policies are broadly worded, as they apply to all relatives of the
employee and prohibit the employment of relatives anywhere in the
organization. Other policies are more narrowly worded, applying only
to spouses, or restricting the employment of spouses or relatives only in
cases where they will be in supervisor-subordinate roles.
Antinepotism and no-spouse rules are often justified on the grounds
that they address a number of problems associated with the presence of
paired employees. For example, it has been argued that antinepotism
and no-spouse rules reduce conflicts of interests that might result from
having married employees supervising each other's work. Moreover,
these policies are believed to reduce the likelihood that employees
receive favorable treatment based on familial relationships with other
members of the organization, thus ensuring fairer treatment among all
employees when making employment decisions. Antinepotism and nospouse rules also prevent employees from bringing domestic problems
into the workplace. At a more practical level, employers have argued
facilitate the administration of work and vacations
that such rules
36
scheduling.
Less recognized, however, are the costs that these rules impose on
employers, employees, and society at large. For example, antinepotism
and no-spouse policies may significantly limit the applicant pool in
smaller communities where only one or two major employers are

33. Espinoza v. Thoma, 580 F.2d 346, 347 (8th Cir. 1978).
34. Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., 362 N.W.2d 650, 651 (Mich. 1984).
35. Keckeisen v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 612, 509 F.2d 1062, 1063 (8th Cir. 1975).
36. See ALFRED G. FaLu, PRIMER ON INDrViDUAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 249-51 (2d
ed. 1996); Wexler, supra note 17, at 134-39.
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present. 37 Additionally, they fail to capitalize on retention benefits
associated with hiring paired employees, they result in lost investments
in human capital if employees choose to marry (and one is forced to
resign his or her position), and they fail to take advantage of reductions
38 that may occur when employees work in the
in inter-role conflicts
39
same organization.
From the perspective of individual employees, no-spouse and
antinepotism policies have several effects. These policies often limit
employment opportunities for dual-earner couples.4 This is especially
true for individuals who possess very specific skills and abilities, for
which there might be limited employment opportunities, or for
individuals in rural areas, where employment opportunities are generally
limited. 41 Even where employment opportunities are plentiful, such
policies could prevent a person from being employed to his or her full
capacity. Employees not satisfied with the limited options caused by
antinepotism policies and no-spouse rules might choose to make longer
commutes or to live apart from one another in order to pursue their
chosen occupations. In extreme cases, employees might choose to
terminate their employment and take a job elsewhere to enhance the
opportunities of family members, representing a cost to both the
employer and the employee.
What makes these policies interesting from a legal perspective is that
their effects are unlikely to be felt equally by all employees. Two
significant differences are especially relevant when reviewing the legal
treatment of these policies. First, the intent of these policies is to avoid
the employment of married employees, specifically dual-earner couples.
Accordingly, they are not implemented to exclude those employees that
are not married, nor targeted at employees that might be in a romantic
relationship but are not married. Indeed, it is instructive to note that
antinepotism and no-spouse rules are rarely linked with strict policies
against workplace romance, which themselves are fairly rare.4 2 Yet
37. Dennis Alerding, Note, The Family that Works Together... Can't: No-Spouse
Rules As Marital Status Discrimination Under State and Federal Law, 32 J. FAM. L.
867, 869 (1993-94).
38. "Inter-role conflicts" refers to conflicts between roles as a wife or mother and
an employee or as a husband or father and an employee. See Werbel & Hames, supra
note 8, at 320.
39. See Werbel & Hames, supra note 8, at 319-20.
40. See Christine M. Reed, Antinepotism Rules and Dual CareerCouples: Policy
Questionsfor Public PersonnelAdministrators, 17 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 223, 223-28
(1988).
41. Alerding, supra note 37, at 867, 869-70.
42. See Andrea Warfield, Co-Worker Romances: Impact on the Work Group and
on Career-Oriented Women, PERSONNEL, May 1987, at 22, 26. A 1985 survey of
Fortune 500 companies revealed that only 6% of the responding companies had formal
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romantic relationships that occur outside of marriage are just as likely to
cause work-related problems as those involving married employees,
creating a double standard in the workplace that unfairly singles out
married employees. 43 Second, to the extent that paired employment
lessens work and family conflicts, it should be of greater value to
women who, prior research suggests, may be more prone to experience
work and family conflicts than men.44 Therefore, antinepotism and nospouse rules should create more significant obstacles to employment
opportunities for married women than married men.
III. A SURVEY OF CASE LAW
Prior legal research examining marital status discrimination typically
considered a few representative cases of the broader body of judicial
decisions, focusing on the logic and consistency of court opinions
interpreting various discrimination statutes. 45 While this approach is
helpful, and indeed we adopt such an approach in the following section,
at times this approach limits our ability to identify important patterns in
the development of case law. Therefore, rather than simply study
several marital status discrimination cases, we also conducted a content
analysis of litigation alleging marital status discrimination resulting from
antinepotism and no-spouse rules. Doing so enabled us to more fully
exploit information provided in court decisions and thus provides a more
comprehensive assessment of marital status discrimination litigation as
applied to antinepotism and no-spouse rules. Before presenting these
results, we first briefly describe our methodology in collecting and
analyzing the cases.
A. Overview and Methods
We used the WESTLAW computerized legal reporting service to
locate as many published federal and state court decisions as possible
that involved claims of marital status discrimination. Our research
produced thirty-four federal cases and thirty-five state cases related to

policies prohibiting workplace romance. Id.
43. See Wexler, supra note 17, at 138-39.
44. See Jeffrey H. Greenhaus & Nicholas J. Beutell, Sources of Conflict Between
Work and Family Roles, 10 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 76, 83-84 (1985).
45. See, e.g., Steiner & Steinberg, supra note 10, at 256. Wexler, supra note 17, at
79-80.
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no-spouse and antinepotism rules, spanning the years 1975 to 1998.46
After the relevant court decisions were identified, each was analyzed
using a survey form prepared by the authors based on their review of
prior legal studies of marital status discrimination. The form, which was
used to extract standardized information about the substance and
disposition of each case, focused on four key sets of variables:
characteristics of the complainant, characteristics of the employer,
important aspects of the marital status discrimination claim, and the case
determination.
Five characteristics of the complainant and employee were coded: sex,
marital status, race, occupation, and union membership. Organizational
characteristics of the employer comprised two categories: public versus
private sector employer, and manufacturing versus service employer.
The readers' ability to code each variable depended on the level of detail
provided in the court opinion. In some instances, information not
directly provided in the opinion could be inferred. However, when there
was doubt, the variable was coded as "unknown."
Three aspects of the marital status discrimination claim were
examined. These included the employment action being challenged (for
example, discipline, discharge, or hiring), the alleged basis for the
employment action (marriage to another employee or dating another
employee for example) and the specific employment policy being
challenged. The case determination section of the form examines four
variables: the basis for the marital status discrimination legal challenge,
the defense offered by the employer for the employment action that was
taken, who won the case, and the basis for the court's decision. With
regard to the latter, we attempted to determine whether the court applied
a broad interpretation of marital status discrimination by considering the
identity and occupation of the employee's significant other, or used a
narrow interpretation of marital status discrimination, by examining only
whether the action was taken because of the employee's marital status.47
By reviewing the complete population of MSD cases, we are able to
describe the experiences of claimants who have alleged MSD under
antinepotism or no-spouse rules at different levels of the judiciary (state
and federal), as well as the degree of success of claimants under
different regimes.
B. Results
Our search identified sixty-nine cases challenging antinepotism and

46.
47.

See infra app. tbl4.
See infra Part IV.C.4.
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no-spouse rules, of which thirty-five were decided in federal courts and
thirty-four in state courts. As shown in Table 1,48 the vast majority of
the seventy-nine alleged victims were married employees (84%), most
often women (71%). 4 1 Our results also indicate that a majority of cases
originated in the service sector (88%) and were slightly more likely to
involve public sector (53%) as opposed to private sector (47%)
employers. These findings are consistent with recently published
commentary on the negative effects of marriage on women's
employment outcomes, particularly the tendency of them to suffer most
when career conflicts occur within the family and the relatively high
concentration of women in service sector jobs.5
As summarized in Table 2,51 a review of published court decisions
also revealed that most cases involved challenges to antinepotism rules,
which generated more than twice the number of lawsuits as no-spouse
rules. Although a wide range of employment actions were challenged by
employees who alleged unfair treatment under various restrictive
employment policies, the most common were cases involving hiring
decisions (nineteen), followed by forced resignations (fifteen), employee
discipline or discharge (fifteen), and forced transfers (fourteen). The
common link shared by these cases is that they usually represent threats
to a person's potential or continued employment rather than merely
changes in one's employment conditions (for example, wages or
insurance coverage).
Interestingly, these simple descriptive results mask important
differences between women and men in terms of the types of
employment actions challenged. Results indicate that women were most
likely to claim victimization related to hiring decisions (29%), while for
men it was forced transfers (35%). The second most commonly
challenged employment action by women was forced resignation (23%)
while for men it was disciplinary action (26%). In short, the loss of
employment opportunities appears more likely for women than men
under these employment policies.
Perhaps not surprising given the demographic characteristics of
48. See infra app. tbl.1.
49. Some cases allege victimization of multiple persons, thus causing the number
of alleged victims to exceed the number of cases.
50. See Barbara R. Bergmann, Work-Family Policies and Equality Between
Women and Men, in GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE 277, 278-79
(Francine D. Blau & Ronald G. Ehrenberg eds., 1997).
51. See infra app.
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plaintiffs and the nature of the policies being examined, these cases
almost exclusively challenge employment actions that are taken due to
the employee being married. Moreover, in sixty-one of the sixty-nine
cases (88%), there was a direct working relationship between family
members, often in the same department or division, that led to the
employment action. However, only 19% of the cases actually involved a
supervisor-subordinate relationship--the type of employment relationship
involving the greatest opportunity for conflicts of interest.
As for the legal basis for challenging the employment action, results
shown in Table 2 indicate that at the federal level constitutional
challenges and suits based under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act were
the most common causes of action (twenty-one and thirteen cases
respectively). In contrast, twenty-four of the thirty-five actions brought
to state courts were based on the state's civil rights or antidiscrimination
law, owing to the more direct treatment of marital status discrimination
under state law. Consistent with previously published commentary on
antinepotism and no-spouse related lawsuits, employers typically
defended their actions citing the presumed harm associated with having
married employees working together; however, only a few provided
actual evidence of business necessity.
Employees were generally unsuccessful when challenging antinepotism
and no-spouse rules, winning only 29% of the time.5 2 However, employees
were more likely to succeed in state court (49%) than in federal court
(9%), perhaps reflecting the existence of state legislation prohibiting
marital status discrimination.
The three federal court cases won by employees involved challenges
under Title VII. 53 Two of these cases involved a disparate treatment
claim, wherein the employer had either applied a no-spouse rule only to
female employees,54 or made comments that the court found to be evidence
of disparate treatment.55 The remaining case, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Rath Packing Co.,56 involved a disparate
impact claim. The Rath Packing case is notable because it is the only
case in which a federal court of appeals ruled that a no-spouse rule
amounted to disparate impact discrimination. Interestingly, employees
never prevailed in federal court cases when the case involved a
52. See infra app. tbl.3.
53. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d
318 (8th Cir. 1986); George v. Farmers Electric Coop., 715 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983);
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
54. Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1196.
55. George, 715 F.2d at 177 (finding that a statement that wife was chosen for
termination under antinepotism policy because husband was head of household could be
interpreted as meaning that husband was retained because he was a man).
56. 787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1986).
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constitutional challenge.
With regard to the disposition of state court cases involving legal
challenges to antinepotism and no-spouse rules, our review focused on
the distinction between the courts' application of a narrow as opposed to
a broad interpretation of marital status discrimination. Our findings,
reported in Table 3, indicate that state courts were nearly evenly split in
terms of their use of narrow and broad definitions of marital status.
However, our results suggest that employees are more likely to prevail
when marital status discrimination is broadly defined by the court (67%
of the time), as opposed to narrowly defined (38% of the time).
C. Summary
Our analysis identifies several interesting trends. First, women are
more likely than men to claim victimization based on MSD. Of the
seventy-nine alleged victims of MSD, fifty-six (71%) were women.
Moreover, the manner in which women and men are affected by
antinepotism and no-spouse rules differs significantly. Compared to
men, women are much more likely to experience loss of employment
opportunities, making the impact of such policies more severe for
women than men. Finally, we find that plaintiffs alleging MSD due to
the application of antinepotism or no-spouse rules rarely prevail in court.
The burden of proof difficulties inherent in these types of legal
challenges are rooted in the legislative frameworks that guide judicial
decision making in this area at the federal and state levels. A review of
this legislation and a more in-depth analysis of judicial decisions better
explain the difficulties confronting plaintiffs who challenge antinepotism
or no-spouse rules.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE SCHEME

A. Title VII
Under Title VII,57 individuals challenging a no-spouse rule can base
their claims on either disparate treatment or disparate impact theories.
Disparate treatment cases in this area are rare because they require the
plaintiff to establish that the employer's no-spouse policy is discriminatory
on its face, as for example, a rule that requires spouses of one sex either
57.

42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-2(a) (2000).
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to quit, transfer, or be fired, without placing the same burden on the
other sex spouse. 58 Plaintiffs are more likely to succeed if they can
present evidence that the employer intended to discriminate on the basis
of sex. In George v. Farmers Electric Cooperative,59 the plaintiff was
terminated on the grounds that her continuing employment violated an
antinepotism policy adopted by her employer. 0 After both the plaintiff
and her husband refused to voluntarily decide who was going to leave,
the employer decided to terminate the plaintiff. 61 In explaining the
termination decision, the plaintiffs supervisor noted that the decision
was made because the "[the plaintiffs husband] was the head of the
household. 62 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
upheld a lower court finding that the statement by the employer implied
that the husband was retained because he was a man and the plaintiff
was a woman. 63 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that the lower court
was correct in finding that the plaintiffs termination constituted
impermissible discrimination under Title VII. 64
Disparate impact cases, on the other hand, require the plaintiff to
prove that a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.65 The plaintiff must
convincingly demonstrate that the specific employment practice caused
the disparity66 and that it has a significant disparate impact on
employment opportunities. 67 If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case of disparate impact, the burden shifts to the employer to justify the

58. See, e.g., Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1194 (holding that a no-marriage rule for flight
attendants violated Title VII); see also Alerding, supra note 37, at 871 (noting that to
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, "the plaintiff must show
that the facially neutral standard in question tends to disfavor a particular class").
59. 715 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983).
60. Id. at 177. The policy provided: "[W]hen any two employees become 'close
relatives' [as defined in II(c) to include spouses] by marriage or otherwise, one of them
will be required to terminate his/her employment with the Cooperative.
The
determination as to which employee shall terminate will be made by the affected
employees." Id. (alteration in original).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 177-78.

64.

Id.

65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
66. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982); Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87 (1988).
67. Fudge v. City of Providence Fire Dept., 766 F.2d 650, 658 (1st Cir. 1985).
While the Supreme Court has not required the use of sophisticated statistical techniques
to demonstrate the existence of disparate impact, lower courts have required plaintiffs to
establish statistical significance in order to make out a prima facie case of disparate
impact. "We think that in cases involving a narrow data base, the better approach is for
the courts to require a showing that the disparity is statistically significant, or unlikely to
have occurred by chance, applying basic statistical tests as the method of proof." Id.

HeinOnline -- 39 San Diego L. Rev. 46 2002

[VoL. 39: 31, 2002]

Spouses Need Not Apply
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

employment practice. Under the "business necessity" defense, the
employer needs to show that the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and that it is consistent with business necessity.6 8
Finally, if the employer can establish a business necessity defense, the
plaintiff may still prevail by showing that there existed an alternative
employment practice that would meet the employer's interests with less
discriminatory impact.69
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not decided any marital discrimination
cases under Title VII, various courts of appeals have confronted the
question. In Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-FordCo., the Seventh Circuit ruled
on a disparate impact challenge to a no-spouse policy. 70 Yuhas involved
a challenge to an employer's rule prohibiting employment of spouses of
currently employed hourly employees. In Yuhas, the plaintiff contended
that the employer's rule had a discriminatory impact because application
of the rule caused seventy-one women, compared to three men, to be
denied employment because their spouses were already employed as
hourly employees.7 '
The district court found that although the no-spouse rule was neutral
on its face, it had "a greatly disparate impact,"7 2 shifting then the burden
of proof to the employer to establish that the rule served a legitimate,
business related function. The employer attempted to meet its burden of
proof by first arguing that hourly workers who were married to each
other were absent from work or tardy more often than other workers.73
Second, the employer posited that the employment of both marriage
partners led to problems scheduling vacations and work assignments.74
Finally, the employer argued that "the employment of both spouses
undermined employee morale and efficiency because the relationship
between the spouses interfered with ordinary relationships workers have
with each other and with their supervisors." 75 The district court rejected
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d
1112, 1112 (11th Cir. 1993) (describing an alternative employment practice as
"alternative policies with lesser discriminatory effects that would be comparably as
effective at serving the employer's identified business needs").
70. Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496,497 (7th Cir. 1977).
71. Id.
72. Id.
-73. Id.; see also Mahroom v. Alexander, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,580
(N.D. Cal. 1979).
74. Yuhas, 562 F.2d at 497.
75. Id.
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the employer's arguments, enjoining the defendant from continuing to
maintain its no-spouse rule.76
While the court of appeals agreed with the district court's finding that
the rule had a disparate impact, it rejected the court's finding that the
employer had failed to advance a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for the no-spouse rule.77 Relying on the employer's argument regarding
the morale and efficiency problems created by employing both partners
in a marriage, the court of appeals provided a number of reasons why
employers might assume that allowing married couples to work together
is a "bad idea.",78 First, the court noted that the "marital relationship
often generates intense emotions which [could] interfere with a worker's
job performance," and which the typical employee might be unable to
put aside at work.79 Second, employing both spouses could have detrimental
effects on hiring decisions (for example, where an already employed
spouse intervenes on behalf of his or her spouse to the detriment of the
employer or any more qualified persons who did not obtain the job
because of this intervention), and could unnecessarily complicate the
employment process (the perverse incentives that might be generated,
for example, in resolving a work grievance when the two spouses are
involved).8" The court also noted problems related to effective supervision
when an employee acquires a supervisory position over his or her spouse. 81
In analyzing these reasons, the court recognized that there was no
specific evidence to prove that the no-spouse rule had a positive effect
on production, or as the court noted, "without the rule, production would
fall.
On the other hand, the court noted that these reasons were "far
from frivolous,

83

and that the reasons supporting the no-spouse rule

corresponded to reasons which had led a number of institutions in
society to conclude that family members should not work in the same
environment. Finding that the no-spouse rule plausibly improved the
work environment and that the rule did not penalize women on the basis
of their environmental or genetic background, the court concluded84 that
the rule was job related and therefore in compliance with Title VII.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also
confronted a challenge to a no-spouse rule in Equal Employment Opportunity

76. Id.
77. Id. at 498-99.
78. Id. at 499.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.

83.
84.

Id.
Id. at 500.
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Commission v. Rath Packing Co. 85 While the court's opinion is not
explicit as to whether the no-spouse rule resulted in the denial of
employment opportunities to women more often than men, the court
found that the employer had by other means discriminated on the basis
of sex in violation of Title VII. 86 Regarding the no-spouse rule, the
question for the court of appeals was whether the employer had
advanced a legitimate business reason in support of the rule.87 In dealing
with this issue, the district court applied the Yuhas standard. 8 According
to the district court, while Rath had been "unable to statistically corroborate
its contention that production was adversely affected" by permitting the
hiring of spouses, it had demonstrated "an acceptable business-related
basis for the rule," and established that the "anti-spousal policy was
objectives of optimum
enacted to achieve the interrelated business
89
production and employee performance."
The Eighth Circuit, however, rejected the Yuhas standard and held that
the employer must affrmnatively show legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for not hiring or discharging the spouse of an employee. 90 The
court stated that a "compelling need" for the no-spouse rule must exist,
that the rule must be aimed at a problem that is "concrete and
demonstrable, not just 'perceived,"' and that "the rule must be essential
to eliminating the problem, not simply reasonable or designed to
improve conditions."9 1 Having established the proper standard, the court
of appeals evaluated the employer's stated reasons for the no-spouse
rule.92 The employer's reasons, which paralleled those advanced in
Yuhas, were all dismissed. According to the court, the employer failed
to establish that either absenteeism, or scheduling of vacations and work
assignments, or even potential problems associated with employees
supervising their spouses, had any demonstrable effect on safety and
efficiency in the workplace.93
Thus, whether plaintiffs are successful in challenging no-spouse rules
depends to a large measure on whether the court applies the Rath or the
85.
86.
87.

787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 328.
Id. at331.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 332.
Id.
Id. at 332-33.

93. Id.
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Yuhas standard. The Yuhas analysis does not require the employer to
offer specific evidence of problems caused by having spouses working
together. The employer need only articulate reasonable presumptions
adequate to prove a business necessity. On the other hand, under Rath,
in order for an employer's no-spouse rule to prevail, the employer must
establish that the problem to be remedied is concrete and demonstrable
by showing that spouse-related personnel problems have resulted in
reduced productivity, decreased job efficiency, or more dangerous working
conditions. The Rath standard makes it more difficult for employers to
raise the business necessity defense because they must then set forth
specific, concrete evidence of the justifications for imposing the nospouse rule. Notice that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is consistent with
the Rath analysis in that the Act codifies the concepts of "business
necessity" and job relatedness as initially
set forth in Griggs v. Duke
95
Power Co. 94 and later followed in Rath.
Of course, the benefits of the Rath standard are only realized if the
plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. This often
proves difficult due to the lack of hard statistical evidence.96 The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc. is
illustrative.97 In Thomas, the plaintiff was fired after she married a
fellow employee who worked in the same department. 98 The no-spouse
rule in place when the plaintiff was hired prohibited any two married
persons from working in the same department. 99 The rule allowed the
married couple to decide which spouse would quit.' 00 If neither quit, the
rule provided that the company would then fire the employee with lesser
seniority.' 0 ' Since neither the plaintiff nor her husband quit, the employer
°
fired the plaintiff because she had less seniority than her spouse.1 2
The plaintiff challenged the no-spouse rule based on disparate
impact. 1 3 The plaintiff introduced evidence showing that there had been
eight other instances of intrafirm marriage at the particular location.' °4
In seven of the previous instances, either the no-spouse rule was not
violated because the spouses worked in different departments, or
94. 401 U.S. 424,431(1971).
95. See Steiner & Steinberg, supra note 10, at 261.
96. See id.; see also Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 412 (8th
Cir. 1975) ("[S]tatistical evidence derived from an extremely small universe ... has little
predictive value and must be disregarded.").
97. 814 F.2d 1506 (10th Cir. 1987).
98. Id. at 1508.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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accommodations were made to retain both employees by reclassifying
one spouse's work assignment or simply allowing the violation. 10 5 In
one other instance the rule was enforced, also by firing the female
employee.10 6 The plaintiff also introduced expert testimony showing
that, considering all possible marriages between two employees in the
same department at the employer's workplace and that the decision of
who would quit was made either on the basis of preserving the higher
salary or on the basis of seniority, a substantially larger number of
women than men would be terminated. 0 7
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding that the nospouse rule was "a good policy, a proper company business decision,"
and "not discriminatory."'0 s The court of appeals ruled that the
plaintiff's evidence-that female employees were fired in the only two
instances in which the employer enforced the no-spouse rule-was
insufficient to prove a violation of Title VII. 10 9 According to the court,
"a sample of two is too small to make even a 100% impact rate
significant."' 0 Regarding the expert testimony presented by the
plaintiff, the court of appeals noted that the testimony was flawed in that
it assumed that either salary differential or seniority was the deciding
factor in a couple's decision."'
The court emphasized that the
employer's rule did not require that the lower wage spouse be terminated
and only used seniority as the deciding factor when the couple failed to
decide on their own who would quit." 2 Accordingly, concluded the
court, the plaintiff failed to prove that the rule had a disparate impact." 3
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1510. "From a universe of 3687 possible marriages ....[the expert]
found that in 62.1% of the marriages the woman would have the lesser salary." Id. The
expert also found that in 52.4% of the cases, the woman would have the lesser seniority.
Id.
108. Id. at 1508.
109. Id. at 1509.
110. Id. A similar argument was accepted by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Harper v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F.2d 409, 412 (8th Cir. 1975) (pointing out the fact
that out of the five couples to which a no-spouse rule had been applied, four cases
resulted in the wife leaving employment voluntarily, and therefore did not amount to
persuasive statistical proof of discrimination). See also Tuck v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 421
F. Supp. 39, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (ruling that testimony, in all but one case where the nospouse rule was applied to two employees who married, stating that it was the women
who left the employment did not meet plaintiffs burden of proof).
111. Thomas, 814F.2d at 1510-11.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1511-12.

HeinOnline -- 39 San Diego L. Rev. 51 2002

The argument that no-spouse rules do not generally require the spouse
with less seniority or lower salary to terminate his or her employment
and, therefore, that women are
not necessarily the ones to leave, has
14
proven decisive in other cases.'
B. ConstitutionalChallenges
No-spouse rules have also been challenged under the Civil Rights
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.115 In two recent cases, the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of whether no-spouse rules
violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.'16 In Wright v. MetroHealthMedical Center,' 17
the employer, a public hospital, ordered the transfer of a spouse to a
different location, under the employer's no-spouse rule." 8 The nospouse rule in dispute prohibited members of the immediate family from
"being in positions which are of such close proximity that they would
necessarily interact with each other in the performance of their
duties."" 9
Plaintiffs argued that the employer's no-spouse rule violated their
fundamental right to marry, and thus, when reviewing the rule, the court
should apply a strict standard of scrutiny. 120 While the court of appeals
agreed that the right to marry is a fundamental right, the court disagreed
on the standard of scrutiny applicable in evaluating no-spouse rules.'12
According to the court, not every state action that affects a fundamental
right must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. 122 Only those regulations
that significantly interfere with the right to marry must be reviewed
under the heightened standard of scrutiny.
The court proceeded to
determine whether the employer's no-spouse rule significantly interfered
with the right to marry. 24 On this issue, the court noted that the nospouse rule did not create a legal obstacle preventing a class of people
from marrying; it did not require that a person be terminated, merely that

114. See, e.g., Harper,525 F.2d 409, 412.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also Wexler, supra note 17, at
115-24 (discussing constitutional claims against antinepotism rules based on the
fundamental right to marry).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
117. 58 F.3d 1130 (6th Cir. 1995).
118. Id. at 1132.
119. Id.at 1132-33.
120. Id.at 1134.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.at 1134-35.
124. Id.at 1135-36.
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one spouse be transferred to a different department. l 25 The court
concluded that the employer's rule did not directly and substantially
interfere with the fundamental right to marry, and thus, when evaluating
the rule, a court must not apply the stricter standard
of review, but
126
instead must use the less demanding rational basis test.
In reviewing the district court's application of the rational basis test,
the court had the opportunity to comment on the justifications for
adopting no-spouse rules. 27 These were similar to those found in cases
under Title VII, namely the avoidance of "potential conflicts that might
arise when two closely related persons allow their personal lives to
impinge on their professional lives, and [preventing] morale among
other [employees] from deteriorating due to the unique relationship
between the married co-workers."1 28 The court concluded that these
reasons provided a rational basis for the employer's
no-spouse rule that
129
furthered legitimate government interests.
In Montgomery v. Carr,130 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals again
confronted a constitutional challenge to a no-spouse rule.
In
Montgomery, the plaintiffs argued that the employer's rule preventing a
married couple from working together as teachers on the same campus
violated their First Amendment associational rights to marry.131 Similar
to its analysis in Wright,132 the appeals court first inquired into whether
the no-spouse rule imposed a direct and substantial burden on the right
of marriage. 133 The court recognized that the no-spouse rule imposed
"some costs and burdens on marriage," but such costs were not so direct
134
or substantial as to warrant a heightened standard of scrutiny.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1136.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.; see also Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 43 F.3d 609, 615 (11th Cir. 1995)
(upholding under rational basis scrutiny an antinepotism policy as a means of "avoiding
conflicts of interest between work-related and family-related obligations"); Keckeisen v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. 612, 509 F.2d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir. 1975) ("We have no doubt that in
many cases where husbands and wives are employed in supervisor-supervisee capacities,
the married couple makes an exemplary effort to maintain fairness, but we cannot say
that a policy based on the assumption that married couples are susceptible to the natural
prejudices of their relationships is irrational, arbitrary or capricious.").
130. 101 F.3d 1117 (6th Cir. 1996).
131. Id. at 1118.
132. Wright, 58 F.3d at 1134-35.
133. Montgomery, 101 F.3d at 1124.
134. Id. at 1125.
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Accordingly, the court proceeded to evaluate the no-spouse rule under
the rational basis test, finding that the justifications for adoption of the
rule represented a legitimate government interest and that the rule
35
amounted to a rational means for securing those government interests.1
C. State Law
While there is no federal legislation specifically addressing marital
status discrimination, twenty-five states and territories have enacted such
legislation, providing better opportunities to challenge antinepotism and
no-spouse rules. 136 Generally speaking, these laws prohibit MSD by all
private sector employers and labor unions, 137 though a few states' laws
135. Id. at 1130. The employer advanced eight justifications for the no-spouse rule:
(1) avoiding friction and possibly violence in the workplace if a marriage
between [the employees] broke down, (2) preventing one spouse from
prejudging students that the other spouse had already experienced difficulties
with, (3) cutting down on social fraternization that can hinder Uob
performance], (4) minimizing the friction caused by married teachers who
have a "you and I against the world" mentality,... (5) promoting collegiality
among teachers, (6) minimizing lost productivity among married couples and
other teachers, (7) easing the task of managing teachers... (8) avoiding the
"total chaos" that would result from the disruption of other unwritten personnel
policies that might be violated if the [employer] allowed its [no-spouse rule] to
be ignored.
Id.; see also Parsons v. County of Del Norte, 728 F.2d 1234, 1237 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The
[employer] asserts justification for the rule in that it avoids conflicts of interest and
favoritism in employee hiring, supervision, and allocation of duties. The structure of the
rule bears a rational relationship to this end and therefore passes constitutional muster.");
Cutts v. Fowler, 692 F.2d 138, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Antinepotism rules play a
legitimate and laudatory role in preventing conflicts of interest and favoritism in the
working environment. At the same time, the burden on the 'right to marry' is attenuated
and indirect.").
136. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (Michie 2000); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940
(West 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402(1)(h)(II) (West 2001); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46a-60 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1995); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-2512(a) (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10(1)(a), (3)(a) (West 1997); GA.
CODE ANN. § 45-2-9 (Harrison 1998); HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-2(1) (1993); 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT ANN. 5/1-103(Q) (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009(a) (2000); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 7051(2), 4572(1)(A) (West 1964 & Supp. 2000); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49B, §16(a)(1) (1998 & Supp. 2001); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2102
(West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 49-2-303 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1104 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
354-A:7 (1995 & Supp. 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1993); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 296 (McKinney 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-03, 14-02.4-05 (1997); OR. REV.
STAT. § 659.030 (1999); 29 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 146 (1995 & Supp. 1999); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.180, 49.60.190 (West 1990 & Supp. 2001); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
111.322 (West 1997).
137. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(1)-(2) (Michie 2000); CAL. GOV'T CODE §
12940(a)-(b) (West 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402 (1)(h)(II) (West 2001);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a)(1), (3) (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §
711(a)(1), (d) (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512(a)(1), (3) (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
760.10(l)(a), (3)(a) (West 1997); HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-2(l)(A)-(B) (1993); 775 ILL.
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apply to public sector employers.
State marital status discrimination laws are quite varied in terms of
how marital status is defined and which aspects of the employment
relationship are regulated. In this Section, we briefly describe various
state statutes prohibiting marital status discrimination, and review
several state court decisions dealing with antinepotism and no-spouse
rules.
1. Defining MaritalStatus
A review of state marital status discrimination laws suggests that there
is significant variability in the way state laws define marital status.
Eleven states or jurisdictions with marital status laws have legislation
saying only that marital status is protected. 139 While it may be
reasonable to assume that all forms of marital status are covered (e.g.,
being single, divorced, or widowed), that need not be the case; the laws
leave considerable room for interpretation. The other fifteen states have
adopted more precise definitions of marital status by specifying which
type of marital status is covered by the legislation.'4 Four jurisdictions,
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-102(A) (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009(a) (2000); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 49(B), § 16(a)(1) (1998 & Supp. 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. §§
37.2202(1)(a)-(b), 37.2204(a) (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West 1991 &
Supp. 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303(a)-(b) (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1104,
48-1106 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7(1)-(2) (1995 & Supp. 2001); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a)-(b) (West 1993); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1)(a), (c) (McKinney
2001); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-03, 14-02.4-05 (1997); OR. REV. STAT. §
659.030(1)(a), (c) (1999); 29 P.R. LAWS ANN. §§ 146-147 (1995 & Supp. 1999); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.180, 49.60.190 (West 1990 & Supp. 2001); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.322 (West 1997).
138. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-2-9 (Harrison 1998); HAW. REv. STAT. § 76-44 (1993);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7051(2) (West 1964); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-301(1)
(West 2001).
139. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (Michie 2000); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940
(,Vest 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §
711 (1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7051(2) (West 1964); MD. ANN. CODE art.
49(B), § 16(a)(1) (1998 & Supp. 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2202(1) (West
1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7 (1995 & Supp. 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 1402.4-03, 14-02.4-05 (1997); OR. REv. STAT. § 659.030 (1999).
140. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402(1)(h)(I) (West 2001); D.C. CODE ANN. §
1-2502(17) (1999); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 60Y-3.001(17) (1997); GA. CODE ANN. §
45-2-9(a) (Harrison 1998); HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-1 (1993); 775 ILL. CoMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/1-103(J) (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009(a) (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 363.01(24) (West 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(12) (1993); 29 P.R. LAWS ANN. §
146(B) (1995 & Supp. 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (West 1990 & Supp.
2001); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(12) (West 1997 & Supp. 2001); Thompson v. Bd. of
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Colorado,1 4 1 Kansas, 42 New Jersey, 143 and Puerto Rico' 44 provide that
married employees not be treated differently than unmarried employees.
Given that an individual is either married or not married (e.g., single,
divorced, or widowed), this legislation covers all employees. Two
states, Hawaii145 and Nebraska, 146 define marital status as either being
married or single. This might indicate that only these categories are
covered by the legislation, or that everything other than married is
single. Seven jurisdictions (District of Columbia, 47 Florida, 48 Illinois,
Montana, 5 ° New York, 5 ' Washington,' 52 and Wisconsin'5 3 ) distinguish
among different forms of marital status, including married, single,
divorced, widowed, and separated. Minnesota goes further by including
remarried individuals and individuals cohabitating with others. 154 These
eight states appear to cover most conventional forms of marital status,
and thus protect most, if not all, employees. Finally, one state (Georgia)
only provides protection to wives of service men. 55
2. Employment Actions Covered
For the most part, the protections provided under state laws that
prohibit discrimination based on marital status mirror those provided
under Title VII and similar legislation for other forms of discrimination.
Most jurisdictions prohibit tenure decisions, as well as decisions
affecting other terms and conditions
of employment, from being related
156
to, or based upon, marital status.
Trs., 627 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Mont. 1981); Thomson v. Sanborn's Motor Express, 382
A.2d 53, 56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. N.Y. State
Human Rights Appeal Bd., 415 N.E.2d 950, 952 (N.Y. 1980).
141. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402(l)(h)(I) (West 2001). The statute makes
it an unfair employment practice, "[flor any employer to discharge an employee or to
refuse to hire a person solely on the basis that such employee or person is married to or
plans to marry another employee of the employer." Id.
142. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009(a) (2000).
143. See Thomson, 382 A.2d at 55-56.
144. 29 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 146(B) (1995 & Supp. 1999).
145. HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-1 (1993).
146. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-1102(12) (1993).
147. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(17) (1999).
148. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 60Y-3.001(17) (1994).
149. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(J) (West 2001).
150. See Thompson v. Bd. of Trs., 627 P.2d 1229, 1230-31 (Mont. 1981).
151. See Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 415
N.E.2d 950, 952 (N.Y. 1980).
152. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040(7) (West 1990 & Supp. 2001).
153. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(12) (West 1997 & Supp. 2001).
154. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(24) (West 1991).
155.
GA. CODE ANN. § 45-2-9 (Harrison 1998).
156. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (Michie 2000); CAL. Gov'T CODE §
12940 (West 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60 (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
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3. Statutory Defenses
When reviewing the application of MSD legislation to antinepotism
and no-spouse rules, it must be noted that some states' laws provide
employers a number of defenses to challenges to such rules. For
example, Florida, 157 Michigan, 158 Nebraska, 15 9 and New Jersey"60 exclude
16
antinepotism rules that are applied in an evenhanded manner. Alaska,
California,' 62 and Puerto Rico1 63 allow antinepotism rules if a conflict of
interest exists that necessitates the rule in the workplace. Finally,
Minnesota, 164 New Hampshire, 65 and Washington 166 provide for a "bona
fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) defense to challenges to nospouse rules.
4. State Court Decisions
Given the broad and sometimes imprecise definitions of marital status

in many states' marital status discrimination legislation, a lot of
discretion is placed in the hands of state courts to define marital status.
A review of state court decisions suggests that two primary
interpretations prevail, leading to either a narrow interpretation or a
broad interpretation of MSD.

19, § 711(a) (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512(a) (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
760.10(1)(a), (3)(a) (West 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2(1) (1993); 775 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(Q) (West 1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7051(2) (West
1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49(B), § 16(a)(1) (1998); MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. §
37.2202(1) (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 49-2-303 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1104 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 354-A:7 (1995 & Supp. 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1993); N.Y.
ExEc. LAW § 296 (MeKinney 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-03, 14-02.4-05
(1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.030 (1999); 29 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 146 (1995 & Supp.
1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.180, 49.60.190 (West 1990 & Supp. 2001);
WIs. STATANN. § 111.322 (West 1997).
157. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10(8)(d) (West 1997).
158. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2202 (West 1985 & Supp. 2001).
159. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1111(1)(b) (1993).
160.

Ct. App.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See Thomson v. Sanborn's Motor Express, Inc., 382 A.2d 53, 56 (N.J. Super.

Div. 1977).
ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (Michie 2000).
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a)(3)(A) (West 1992 & Supp. 2001).
29 P.R. LAWs ANN. § 146 (1995 & Supp. 1999).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(1)-(2) (West 1991 & Supp. 2001).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7(I) (1995 & Supp. 2001).
WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 49.60.180(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 2001).
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a. Narrow Interpretation
Courts in some states have interpreted MSD narrowly. 167 Under the
narrow interpretation, MSD is defined as discrimination on the basis of
whether a person is married, single, divorced, or widowed.1 68 The
identity of one's spouse is not included in this definition. 169 When
applying a narrow interpretation, the rationale of the courts is that
marital status should be given its plain meaning; if a broader
interpretation were intended by the legislature, the legislature 70would
have either indicated its intent or chosen more specific language.
For example, in Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., the Michigan Supreme
Court examined an employer's policy that required blood relatives and
spouses of employees to quit, transfer, or be fired. 172 The court held that
the state prohibition against marital status discrimination should be
viewed narrowly, requiring an inquiry into whether
the plaintiff "is
173
married rather than to whom [he or she] is married."'
The New Jersey Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in
Thomson v. Sanborn's Motor Express, Inc. 174 The court upheld an
employer's policy excluding relatives from working together in the same
department on the grounds that the policy was "not directed against
married people."'' 7 5 In making this determination, the court narrowly
interpreted
marital status to mean only whether a person was married or
76

single.1

Looking at challenges to no-spouse rules, the narrow definition implies

167. See Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 415
N.E.2d 950, 953 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that "'marital status' is the social condition
enjoyed by an individual by reason of his or her having participated or failed to
participate in a marriage").
168. Id. at 952; see also Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 788
(Alaska 1996) (defining "marital status" as "the condition of being married or
unmarried"); Blackwell v. Danbury Hosp., No. 321561, 1996 WL 409370, at *3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1996) ("[T]he definition of 'marital status' can only be the condition of being
single, married, separated, divorced or widowed."); Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., 362
N.W.2d 650, 653 (Mich. 1984) ('The relevant inquiry [in defining marital status] is if
one is married rather than to whom one is married.").
169. See Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc., 415 N.E.2d at 952 (rejecting the New York
Human Rights Division's position that marital status should be construed broadly to
embrace the identity or situation of the individual's spouse).
170. See id. at 953 ("[T]he plain and ordinary meaning of 'marital status' is the
social condition enjoyed by an individual by reason of his or her having participated or
failed to participate in a marriage.").
171. 362 N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 1984).
172. Id. at 651.
173. Id. at 653.
174. 382 A.2d 53, 56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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that plaintiffs claiming MSD under such policies will be unlikely to
succeed unless the employer denies employment to every married

person. Thus, an employee who loses her job because her spouse was an
employee, but would not have lost it if her spouse worked somewhere
else, would not be protected under statutes or by courts applying the

narrow definition. This interpretation results in the apparent anomaly of
protecting spouses that do not work together to a larger extent than
protecting spouses that work together.
This narrow construction of the term "marital status" appears to result,
in part, from court concerns with the implications of adopting a contrary
policy. As the Alaska Supreme Court noted recently: 'The more expansive
interpretation of the term 'marital status' does not protect the members
of the class, but instead effectively enlarges it to include all persons
wishing to work with their spouses, thus invalidating any relevant antinepotism policies."' 177 Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court noted:

"To include the identity, occupation, and place of employment of one's
spouse within the definition of 'marital status' might enlarge the
protected class to include all married persons who desire to work with
their spouse.
Such a construction would invalidate most antinepotism
178

policies."'

b. BroadInterpretation
Courts in other states have interpreted their marital status discrimination
laws more broadly. Under the broad interpretation of marital status, not
only the actual state of being married, single, divorced, or widowed is
examined,
but also the identity and occupation of the individual's
179
spouse.

177. Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 790-91 (Alaska 1996).
178. Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., 362 N.W.2d 650, 654 (Mich. 1984). The court
went on to point out that under such an "expansive construction," an employee "whose
wife is the chief executive officer of his employer's major competitor," would also be a
member of the protected class. Id. at 654 n.10.
179. Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 879 P.2d 1037, 1041 (Haw. 1994) (rejecting a
restrictive reading of the statute under which the identity of an employee's spouse would
not have been included in the definition of marital status); Kraft, Inc. v. Minnesota, 284
N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1979) (rejecting the view that marital status "does not embrace
the identity or situation of one's spouse"); Thompson v. Bd.of Trs., 627 P.2d 1229, 1231
(Mont. 1981) (defining marital status under state law to include "the identity and
occupation" of an individual's spouse); Wash. Water Power Co. v. Wash. State Human
Rights Comm'n, 586 P.2d 1149, 1153-54 (Wash. 1978) (finding that antinepotism
employment practices which are based on the identity of an employee's or applicant's
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For example, in Thompson v. Board of Trustees, the Montana Supreme
Court confronted a challenge to a policy adopted by a school district
forbidding school administrators from having a spouse employed in any
capacity by the school system.' 80 The school board had taken adverse
employment actions against two administrators whose wives were
employed as teachers.' 18 The Montana Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's conclusions that held that marital status meant only whether an
individual was married or not.182 According to the Montana Supreme
Court, although the employer in Thompson did not discriminate against
the administrators because they were married per se, the board discriminated
against them because
they were married to particular teachers within the
183
school system.
Washington's Supreme Court has adopted a similar approach. In
Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights
Commission,184 the power company challenged a regulation promulgated85
by the Commission, which generally prohibited marital status discrimination.
Subsequent to the adoption of the Commission's regulation, Washington
Water Power Company brought suit to test the regulation's validity and
challenge its no-spouse policy, which forbade hiring spouses and
required the discharge of an employee whose spouse was already an
employee. 186 Noting that the state's legislature included a section in the
statute calling for a "liberal construction" of the statutory antidiscrimination
provisions, the court upheld the Commission's regulation. 87 The court
reasoned that the state's statute, 188 which prohibits discrimination based
on "marital status," is "broad enough in its import"'189 to cover the
situation at bar where the employer's no-spouse policy is enforced
without regard to "the actual effect of the marital relationship upon the
individual's qualifications or work performance."'190 The court also
noted, regarding the business necessity defense, that the Commission
had made an exception to the prohibition of no-spouse policies "where
one spouse supervises the other, or audits his or her work, or where the
spouse were within the scope of the state's antidiscrimination laws); see also Alerding,
supra note 37, at 876.
180. Thompson, 627 P.2d at 1230.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1230-31.
183. Id. at 1231.
184. Wash. Water Power Co. v. Wash. State Human Rights Comm'n, 586 P.2d
1149 (Wash. 1978).
185. Id. at 1151.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1152-54.
188. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 (West 1990 & Supp. 2001).
189. Wash. Water Power Co., 586 P.2d at 1154.
190. Id. at 1151.

HeinOnline -- 39 San Diego L. Rev. 60 2002

[VOL. 39: 31, 2002]

Spouses Need Not Apply
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

91
spouses are in direct or potential competition with each other."'
In a more recent case, the Hawaii Supreme Court also interpreted
marital status broadly. In Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 19 2 the court
interpreted the state's statute defining marital status as "the state of
being married or being single."' 93 The plaintiff had been cohabiting
with his co-worker for almost one year when he was hired. 9 4 He
married his co-worker soon thereafter.195 A couple of weeks later, the
hotel came under new management that decided to implement and
enforce its no-relatives policy which prohibited persons related by blood
or marriage from working in the same department. 19 6 The plaintiff
challenged the no-spouse rule as a violation of the state's antidiscrimination
laws. 197 In finding the no-spouse rule to violate state law, the Hawaii
Supreme Court reasoned that public policy arguments encouraging
marriage called for a broad interpretation of marital status. 198 In
particular, the court noted that in a small community, no-spouse rules
would require a couple to choose between marriage and employment in
a chosen field. 199 Furthermore, even though the statute defined marital
single," in practice this
status as the "state of being married or being
20
language covers the identity of one's spouse.

191. Id. at 1153. In 1993, the Washington Legislature amended the law against
discrimination to define marital status as "the legal status of being married, single,
separated, divorced, or widowed." Act of July 25, 1993, ch. 510, § 4, 1993 Wash. Laws
2331, 2334 (codified as amended at WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.040(7) (1996 & Supp.
1997)). In Magula v. Benton FranklinTitle Co., 930 P.2d 307 (Wash. 1997), the state's
supreme court was confronted with the issue of whether the 1993 amendment to the
definition of marital status required the court to abandon the broad definition adopted in
Washington Water Power Co. The court avoided the issue since the plaintiff in Magula
was fired before the amendment became effective. Id. at 312-13. The dissent argued,
however, that the change in the statute should narrow the interpretation of marital status
to exclude the identity and actions of an employees' spouse. Magula, 930 P.2d at 31517; see also Katrina R. Kelly, Note, Marital Status Discrimination in Washington:
Relevance of the Identity and Actions of an Employee's Spouse, 73 WASH. L. REv. 135,
146-48 (1998) (challenging the dissent's view that the 1993 amendment changed, rather
than clarified, Washington's existing law).
192. 879 P.2d 1037 (Haw. 1994) [hereinafter Ross 1].
193. HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-1 (1993).
194. Ross II, 879 P.2d at 1039.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Ross. v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawaii) Ltd., Inc., 816 P.2d 302,304 (Haw. 1991)
[hereinafter Ross 1].
199. Id.
200. Ross II, 879 P.2d at 1041 ("One does not 'marry' in some generic sense, but
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In short, the broad interpretation leads to consideration not only of
whether an employee or applicant is married, but also to the identity,
occupation, and employer of the employee's spouse. The use of this
broad definition requires the courts to also inquire into the possible
effects on the workplace of having the spouses working together. The
issue is not just the marital status of an employee or applicant, but
whether working for his or her spouse, or having his or her spouse as a
potential competitor or client, might lead to a conflict of interest. In
states adopting this interpretation, the outcome of MSD cases often
hinges on an employee's ability to do the job without jeopardizing the
business or the employment opportunities of other workers. 20 1 Because
of these business concerns, courts using a broad interpretation have ruled
that to whom one is married, such as a supervisor, competitor, or client,
indicates a potential need to examine the effects of marital status. 20 2 if
the situation could lead to a conflict of interest, then the concern might
be considered legitimate.20 3 However, the employer must demonstrate
that the decision was based on business necessity or a BFOQ, rather than
simply marital status. 2° In short, employers cannot simply assume that
problems might exist, they must produce evidence that a problem has
existed in the past.20 5
D. Summary
At the federal level, Title VII and constitutional protections provide
fairly weak foundations from which to challenge antinepotism and nospouse policies. While the Eighth Circuit's 1986 decision in Rath
required the employer to present specific evidence of legitimate business
reasons for the implementation of a no-spouse rule, other courts have
accepted the employer's business justifications absent specific proof of
business necessity. Even when evidence of business necessity is
required, employees find it difficult to prove disparate impact.
Likewise, when ruling on constitutional challenges to antinepotism and
no-spouse rules, courts have relied on the rational basis test, making it
much easier for employers to justify the use of such employment policies.

marries a specific person.... [T]he 'identity' of one's spouse.., is implicitly subsumed
within the definition of 'being married.' The two cannot be separated.").
201. See, e.g., River Bend Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Human Rights Comm'n,
597 N.E.2d 842 (I11.
App. Ct. 1992) (considering whether the employer's argument that
the conflict of interest likely to arise if a principal was allowed to supervise his spouse
justified the adoption of a no-spouse rule).
202. Id. at 844.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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Plaintiffs seeking to challenge antinepotism and no-spouse rules using
state MSD legislation confront similar difficulties. Although state
legislation prohibiting marital status discrimination provides a more
direct path by which to challenge antinepotism and no-spouse rules, the
success of such claims varies considerably depending on whether the
state courts adopt a broad or a narrow definition of marital status.
V. CONFRONTING CHALLENGES TO MARITAL STATUS
DISCRIINATION CLAIMS

The reluctance of courts to fully embrace MSD claims appears to be
rooted in two basic arguments. First, proponents of the unfettered use of
antinepotism and no-spouse rules argue that such rules are not only sex
neutral, but that there is no ex ante reason to believe that they affect
women more drastically than men. This sentiment is clearly reflected in
the Seventh Circuit's Yuhas decision, where the court noted:
The no-spouse rule in this case does not operate as a "built-in headwind" for
women. It is unlike the requirement in Griggs that an employee have a high
school diploma, or a rule that only the top-ranking contestants on a standardized
test will be selected for employment,... or the rule in Dothard that only people
of a certain size may be hired. These employment tests all had a discriminatory
impact because they focused on personal characteristics which members of a
minority group were not as likely to possess, given their environmental or
genetic background, as other job applicants. The no-spouse rule, on the other
hand, does not place women at a disadvantage because they failed to develop
certain personal characteristics
as a consequence of their environmental or
20 6
genetic backgrounds.

This argument, which we label the "sex-neutral" rationale, implies that
there is no reason to believe that women, when confronted with the
application of these rules, will be more likely than men to lose or quit
their jobs. Thus, courts have concluded that such rules should not be
covered by antidiscrimination legislation.
Second, at least part of the reluctance of courts to liberally construe

antidiscrimination statutes (even those statutes specifically prohibiting
marital status discrimination) appears to be due to a kind of "ability to
manage" concern. That is, courts appear concerned that opening the
door to MSD claims will signal the death knell for antinepotism and nospouse rules. This is particularly troubling to some courts because such
206. Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1977) (citations
omitted).
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rules are sometimes deemed necessary for employers to effectively
manage the workplace. In this Section, we argue that both of these
concerns are unwarranted.
A. The "Sex-Neutral"Argument
One of the major roadblocks experienced by plaintiffs, particularly
women plaintiffs, in challenging no-spouse rules, is the underlying
assumption that these rules are sex neutral and thus should affect men
and women in the same way. Accordingly, federal judges have been
reluctant to accept challenges to no-spouse rules under Title VII unless
specific evidence of discriminatory intent is presented, 7 Even in
jurisdictions in which marital status is a protected class, judges have
refused to broadly interpret the term, again based on the assumption that
such rules are sex neutral and thus nondiscriminatory. 20 8 The problem
with the sex-neutral argument is that it is fundamentally inconsistent
with the employment experiences of dual-earner couples, especially
those of married women, and it is inconsistent with our comprehensive
review of the data analyzed earlier.
Our argument is twofold. First, while antinepotism and no-spouse
rules are sex neutral on their face, women are more likely to be
negatively impacted by such rules. When making determinations
regarding employment decisions (for example, hiring and retention)
between spouses, employers will be significantly more likely to choose
the husband. Second, there are a number of reasons to believe that if the
husband and wife were forced by a no-spouse or antinepotism policy to
decide who should remain with an employer, they would more likely
choose the husband. To understand why these outcomes are expected,
one only need review social science research examining the effects of
marriage on employment outcomes for women and men.
Social science research finds that marriage often has negative effects
on working women's employment outcomes and, when wives work
outside the home, on their husbands' employment outcomes. For
example, a study involving 368 female and male college students who
were asked to evaluate applications for employment, found that the
competence of women was devalued regardless of their marital or
parental status.20 9 Looking specifically at marriage, "married males
were judged to be more dedicated to their profession than married
207. See supra Part IV.A.
208. See supra notes 171-83 and accompanying text.
209. See Claire Etaugh & Helen Czachorski Kasley, Evaluating Competence:
Effects of Sex, Marital Status, and ParentalStatus, 6 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 196, 197-202
(1981).
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females. 21 Similar results have been obtained in studies examining the
effects of employee characteristics on performance evaluations.
Specifically, the attributions made for a person's poor performance
varied depending on the person's marital or parental status.
The married male's performance, relative to the single male's, was
attributed to low effort resulting from a Nonchallenging Job, Temporary Low
Job Interest, and Marital/Family activity. The married female's performance,
relative to the single female's, was attributed more to low effort resulting
from
2 11
Marital/Family Activity and Family/Self Illness, and less to Laziness.

Because women generally have primary responsibility for household
and childrearing chores, attributing poor work performance to such
responsibilities may make employers reluctant to hire and invest in the
careers of married women, particularly those with children.
Studies specifically addressing the impact of family structure on
earnings provide additional evidence of the differential employment
outcomes experienced by married men and women. Although studies
examining the impact of family structure on wages generally find no
significant effects of marriage on women's wages,2 2 there appears to be
a marital wage premium for men, which depends on whether or not his
wife works outside the home. Namely, having a working wife
diminishes the marriage wage premium for men. The working wife
penalty has been found to exist for a broad range of occupation and
employment categories,21 3 but has been found to be larger for managers
and professionals than for blue-collar workers. 4
Given these findings, it should come as no surprise that female
employees often fear that the burden of dealing with dual-earner career
210. Id. at 202.
211. Joyce E. A. Russell & Michael C. Rush, The Effects of Sex and
Marital/ParentalStatus on Performance Evaluations and Attributions, 17 SEX ROLES
221,231 (1987).
212. A recent study examining the effects of marital (and childbirth) delay on
wages, found that such delays significantly increase women's wages. See Timothy D.
Chandler et al., Do Delays in Marriageand ChildbirthAffect Earnings?75 Soc. ScI. Q.
838, 838 (1994).
213. See Joyce P. Jacobsen & Wendy L. Rayack, Do Men Whose Wives Work
Really EarnLess? 86 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 268, 268 (1996).
214. See Jeffrey Pfeffer & Jerry Ross, The Effects of Marriage and a Working Wife
on Occupational and Wage Attainment, 27 ADMIN. SCi. Q. 66, 75 (1982). In fact, a
recent study finds that once the endogeneity of nonmanagers' wives' labor supply
decisions are taken into account, nonmanagers do not suffer a working spouse penalty.
Julie L. Hotchkiss & Robert E. Moore, On the Evidence of a Working Spouse Penalty in
the ManagerialLabor Market, 52 INDUS. & LAB. RE.. REV. 410 (1999).
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conflicts will fall disproportionately on them. A few very high profile
couples, such as Bill and Hillary Clinton and Bob and Elizabeth Dole,
reflect the career tensions that exist in professional couples, al5 and they
are far from alone. In dual-earner households, women are more likely
than men to be involved in dependent moves, that is, moves for the sake
of their spouses' careers. 216 In dual-career couples, seventy-five to
eighty percent of husbands earn more than their wives, 2117 and the highest
paid job usually leads in family career decisions. a 8
There is no reason to expect the underlying factors that cause men and
women to be treated differently in hiring decisions, performance
evaluation, and compensation not to be present during an employer's
application of antinepotism and no-spouse rules. Nor is there any reason
for this state of affairs not to be recognized by dual-earner couples.
Consequently, either through the enforcement of such rules by an
employer, or the married couple's response to such rules, married
women are more likely than married men to be adversely affected.
Indeed, this is supported by our survey of the marital status discrimination
cases brought in courts across the U.S. As discussed earlier, women
were more likely than men to bring MSD claims and experienced more
severe penalties than men from the application of antinepotism and nospouse rules.
To summarize, existing empirical research examining the effects of
marriage on employment outcomes and our survey of MSD litigation
supports the conclusion that antinepotism and no-spouse rules should be
added to the list of institutional factors used to discriminate unfairly and
invalidly, most often against married women. Careful consideration of
these policies within the broader dynamics of the employment
relationship and the cultural attitudes underlying employment practices
belies the "sex-neutral" interpretation given to them by the courts.
B. The "Ability to Manage" Argument
The other argument advanced by courts reluctant to fully embrace
MSD claims is a concern with the effect of such claims on the ability of
215. See Owen Ullmann & Mike McNamee, Couples, Careers, and Conflicts:
Washington's Debate over Power Partnerships,BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 21 1994, at 33.
216. See Anne E. Winkler & David C. Rose, Career Hierarchy in Dual-Earner
Families, in 19 RESEARCH IN LABOR ECONOMICS: WORKER WELL-BEING 147, 151-53
(Solomon W. Polachek ed., 2000); A.E. Green, A Question of Compromise? Case Study
Evidence on the Location and Mobility Strategies of Dual Career Households, 31
REGIONAL STUD. 641, 643 (1997).
217. See Anne E. Winkler, Earnings of Husbands and Wives in Dual-Earner
Families, 121 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 42, 46 (1998).
218. See Winkler & Rose, supra note 216, at 149-50.
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employers to effectively manage their businesses. As discussed earlier,
when defending the implementation of antinepotism and no-spouse
rules, employers have argued that the rules are necessary to avoid a
number of problems that will occur if married couples are allowed to
work together. For example, employers have argued that employing
married couples makes it more difficult for employers to arrange work
and vacation schedules. 19 Employers have also argued that the
employment of married couples is likely to produce a conflict of interest
between the spouses and management, as well as between the spouses
and other employees. 220 For instance, an employee who serves in a
supervisory capacity, and who must make decisions involving his or her
spouse, is likely to confront an unavoidable conflict.221 A decision that
favors the spouse might bring resentment among other employees, and
there is no guarantee that such a decision will not be motivated by the
supervisor's self-interest (maximizing the couple's
222 economic interests),
as opposed to the best interests of the employer.
Finally, employers
have pointed out that, in some instances, spouses who are confronting
domestic difficulties will bring them into the workplace to the detriment
of the employer.2 23
These concerns are misplaced. MSD claims raised under federal or
state law often involve disparate impact type claims. Under both Title
VII as well as a significant number of state statutes, employers can
respond to a disparate impact claim by arguing that their practices do not
2
cause a disparate impact, 4 or by raising the business necessity defense.225
We argue that this framework safeguards an employer's ability to
manage the workplace while at the same time protecting employees from
the discriminatory effects of antinepotism and no-spouse rules.
Under Title VII, for example, after the plaintiff has made a showing of
disparate impact by relying on national data, or data derived from the
use of the challenged practice by other employers, the defendant can
219. Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496, 497 (7th Cir. 1977).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 499.
222. Id.
223. Id.; see also Espinoza v. Thoma, 580 F.2d 346, 347 (8th Cir. 1978) (stating
that excluding spouses may "eliminate the potential for serious conflicts that might affect
job performance"); Wexler, supra note 17, at 134-39 (reviewing the various arguments
employers have raised in support of no-spouse rules).
224. See HAROLD S. LEwis, JR. & ELIZABETH
DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.35 (2001).

225.

J. NORMAN,

Id.
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respond by establishing that the challenged practice did not cause a
disparate impact.226 The employer
227 can then use data from its own workplace
to rebut the plaintiffs claim.
Alternatively, the business necessity defense allows the employer to
come forward with evidence that the "challenged [employment] practice
is job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity. '228 While courts interpreting the business necessity defense
have generally adopted a fairly strict interpretation, 2229 the defense is
available and has been successfully raised in a number of cases. 230 Thus,
we would expect that under the business necessity standard, employers
will be able to successfully apply a no-spouse rule to avoid a situation
where, for example, an employee will serve in a supervisory position
vis-A-vis his or her spouse.
Moreover, the legal arguments aside, our data suggests that MSD
claims are not likely to substantially interfere with the ability of
employers to manage their workplace. First, since the first MSD claims
were brought three decades ago, there has not been an avalanche of
claims in this area. Our sample, which we think represents the
"universe" of cases, includes only sixty-nine MSD claims involving
antinepotism or no-spouse rules. While it may be that the small numbers
of claims are due to the fact, at least at the federal level, that MSD
claims are not actionable unless connected to sex discrimination, our
sample also includes state level cases. Furthermore, as mentioned
earlier,23 1 more than half of the states have some form of marital status
discrimination legislation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite its critics, antidiscrimination legislation has tremendously
improved the work prospects and working conditions of millions of
women and minorities. Such legislation has largely eliminated overt
discriminatory practices, such as the employer's actions in Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, where female flight attendants, but not male attendants,
226. See Michael J. Zimmer et al., CASES
DISCRIMINATION 421-22 (5th

AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT

ed. 2000).

227. See id. at 442.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(ii) (2000).
229. See, e.g., Lanning v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 489 (3d Cir. 1999)
("[A]n employer must demonstrate that its cutoff measures the minimum qualifications
necessary for successful performance of the job in question.").
230. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 1993)
(upholding a fire department's beard ban despite its acknowledged disproportionate
adverse impact on black employees).
231. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
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were required to resign their position if they decided to get married.232
Unfortunately, other employment practices continue to present significant
obstacles for women seeking to enter and establish their place in the
workforce. Particularly problematic have been those policies that, while
neutral on their faces, significantly burden women to a larger extent than
men. Antinepotism and no-spouse rules are an example of these practices.
Antinepotism and no-spouse rules have become increasingly popular
at the same time as the labor force participation rates of women and the
presence of dual-eamer couples have increased in the U.S. The continued
use of antinepotism and no-spouse rules by employers is somewhat
paradoxical given that many U.S. employers have also begun to recognize
the importance of accommodating work and family conflicts.
Perhaps because of this inconsistency, courts have been ambivalent
about the treatment to be afforded to MSD claims. In particular, courts
continue to treat these rules as sex neutral, and deny employees affected
by them any form of relief. In this Article, we argue that courts should
take a more aggressive approach to MSD claims, recognizing that even
though employers have done a lot to accommodate work and family
conflicts, severe institutional obstacles remain which are particularly
problematic for women.
We argue that claims that antinepotism and no-spouse rules are sex
neutral ignore the real-life employment experiences of married women.
These rules are antiquated policies based on a traditional, conservative
view of appropriate gender roles. Their implementation is likely to
disproportionately burden women who are most likely to be seen by
employers as less committed to their jobs and careers, since they tend to
bear a larger burden of family responsibilities. Legal treatment of cases
challenging these rules should not ignore reality.
The practical implications of our argument are twofold. First, our
review of case law in this area, as well as prior research on the impact of
marriage on employment outcomes, makes clear that antinepotism and
no-spouse rules have a disparate impact on women. Plaintiffs challenging
these rules should be able to meet their initial burden of proof by relying
on this kind of evidence. Second, while courts should continue to allow
employers to raise a business necessity defense against MSD claims,
they should likewise require employers to provide real proof of business
necessity. Broad generalizations regarding the behaviors of married
232.

Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir. 1971).
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couples should not be the basis for employers to justify the significant
constraints that antinepotism and no-spouse rules have on women.
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APPENDIX

TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF ALLEGED VICTIMS AND EMPLOYERS*
FEDERAL
APPEALS
COURT

FEDERAL
DIsTRICT
COURT

STATE
COURT

TOTAL

1
19
0
0
1

4
18
0
0
0

7
28
0
0
1

12
65
0
0
2

4
17
0

6
16
0

13
23
0

23
56
0

9
7
3
13
0

9
8
1
16
0

18
17
4
31
0

36
32
8
60
1

ALLEGED VICTIMS

MaritalStatus

Single
Married
Divorced
Widowed
Never stated
Sex

Male
Female
Never stated
Employer

Public
Private
Manufacturing
Service
Indeterminate

*Some cases alleged victimization of multiple persons, thus causing
the number of alleged victims to exceed the number of cases.
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TABLE 2
CHARACTERISTICS OF CASES

FEDERAL
APPEALS
COURT

FEDERAL
DISTRICT
COURT

STATE
COURT

TOTAL

7
6
1
2

7
4
2
5

23
6
0
6

37
16
3
13

2
4
0
0
5
5
0

5
5
0
1
2
4
1

8
6
1
1
12
5
2

15
15
1
2
19
14
3

15
1
0
0
0

14
0
2
0
2

28
1
2
1
3

57
2
4
1
5

EMPLOYMENT POLICY
INVOLVED:

Antinepotism rule
No-spouse rule
No-fraternization rule
Other
EMPLOYMENTACTION
CHALLENGED:

Discipline or Discharge
Forced resignation
Demotion
Promotion
Hiring
Transfer
Other
ACTION TAKEN IN
RESPONSE TO:

Marriage
Cohabitation
Dating
Adulterous relationship
Other
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NATURE OF WORK
RELATIONSHIP LEADING

TO EMPLOYMENTACTIOA

Co-workers in same
department or division
Employed in separate
department or division
Supervisor-subordinate
relationship
Other
No work relationship

10

19

41

4

7

10

13

1

1

5

21

5

15

24

29

3

9

23

44

9

16

LEGAL BAsis FOR
MARITAL STATUS
DISCRIMINATION
CLAIM:

Right to privacy (no
constitutional
challenge)
Constitutional
challenge
Title VII of Civil
Rights Act
State Human or Civil
Rights Act

5

EMPLOYER'S DEFENSE
OFEMPLOYMENT
ACTION:

Evidence of business
necessity and BFOQ
Presumed harm from
employee's actions
Other
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TABLE 3
OUTCOMES OF CASES

FEDERAL
APPEALS

FEDERAL
DISTRICT

STATE

COURT

COURT

COURT

TOTAL

13
3
0

15
1
2

18
17
0

46
21
2

13

17

12

15

2

17

8

20

5

5

8

9

1

1

3

6

COURT RULED IN
FAVOR OF:

Employer
Employee
Other
BASIS FOR COURT
DECISION:

Narrow definition of
marital status
discrimination
Broad definition of
marital status
discrimination
Constitutional
balancing test
Failure to establish
discriminatory
treatment
BASIS FOR COURT
DECISIONS WHICH
FAVORED EMPLOYEES:

Narrow definition of
marital status
discrimination
Broad definition of
marital status
discrimination
Constitutional
balancing test
Established
discriminatory
treatment
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BASIS FOR COURT
DECISIONS AGAINST
EMPLOYEES:

Narrow definition of
marital status
discrimination
Broad definition of
marital status
discrimination
Constitutional
balancing
test
Failure to establish
discriminatory
treatment
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8

12

4

6

1

16

5

14

TABLE 4
CASES INCLUDED IN THE PRESENT STUDY

CASE NAME
1. Blackwell v. Danbury Hosp.
2. Boaden v. Dep't of Law
Enforcement
3. Bradley v. Stump
4. Bretz v. City of Center Line
5. Campbell Plastics, Inc. v. N.Y.
State Human Rights Appeal Bd.
6. Coyle v. Health Care & Ret.
Corp. of Am.
7. Cutts v. Fowler
8. Cybyske v. Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 196
9. EEOC v. Rath Packing Co.
10. Espinoza v. Thoma
11. European Health Spa v.
Human Rights Comm'n of Mont.
12. Fitzpatrick v. Duquesne Light Co.
13. George v. Farmers Elec. Coop., Inc.
14. Harper v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc.
15. Hill v. Human Rights Comm'n
16. Houck v. City of Prairie Village
17. Hulett v. Bozeman Sch. Dist. No. 7
18. Johnson v. Bozeman Sch.
Dist. No. 7
19. Jurinko v. Edwin L.
Weigand Co.
20. Kastanis v. Educ.
Employees Credit Union
21. Keckeisen v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 612
22. Keeney v. Heath
23. Klanseck v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am.
24. Kovich v. Mansfield State Coll.
25. Kraft, Inc. v. Minnesota

CITE
1996 WL409370 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996).
664 N.E.2d 61 (11. 1996).
971 F. Supp. 1149 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
276 N.W.2d 617 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
440 N.Y.S.2d 73 (App. Div. 1981).
1994 WL 928880 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
692 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
347 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1984).
787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1986).
580 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1978).
687 P.2d 1029 (Mont. 1984).
601 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
715 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983).
525 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1975).
735 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. I11.1990).
977 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Kan. 1997).
740 P.2d 1132 (Mont. 1987).
734 P.2d 209 (Mont. 1987).
12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 203
(W.D. Pa. 1974).
859 P.2d 26 (Wash. 1993).
509 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1975).
57 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 1995).
509 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
478 A.2d 950 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984).
284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1979).
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26. Longariello v. Sch. Bd. of
Monroe County
27. Lowry v. Sinai Hosp. of Detroit
28. Magula v. Benton Franklin
Title Co., Inc.
29. Mahroom v. Alexander
30. Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc.
v. N.Y. State Human
Rights Appeal Bd.
31. Md. Comm'n on Human
Relations v. Baltimore
Gas & Elec. Co.
32. McCabe v. Sharrett
33. Meier v. Evansville
Vanderburgh Sch. Corp.
34. Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp.
35. Montgomery v. Carr
36. Moore v. Honeywell Info.
Sys., Inc.
37. Muller v. BP Exploration
(Alaska), Inc.
38. Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber
& Plastics, Inc.
39. Murray v. Silberstein
40. Nat'l Indus., Inc. v. Comm'n
on Human Relations
41. Noecker v. Dep't of Corr.
42. Parks v. City of Warner Robins
43. Parsons v. County of Del Norte
44. River Bend Cmty. Unit Sch.
Dist. No. 2 v. Human
Rights Comm'n
45. Rosenbarger v. Shipman
46. Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co.
(Hawaii) Ltd., Inc.

987 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
343 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
930 P.2d 307 (Wash. 1997).
22 Empl. Prac. Dec. 30,580 (N.D. Cal.
1979).
415 N.E.2d 950 (N.Y. 1980).

459 A.2d 205 (Md. 1983).

12 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1994).
416 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Ind. 1975).
362 N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 1984).
101 F.3d 1117 (6th Cir. 1996).
558 F. Supp. 1229 (D. Haw. 1983).
923 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1996).
946 F. Supp. 1108 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
702 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
527 So. 2d 894 (Fa. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
512 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
43 F.3d 609 (11th Cir. 1995).
728 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1984).
597 N.E.2d 842 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
857 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
879 P.2d 1037 (Haw. 1994).
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47. Sanbonmatsu v. Boyer
48. Sears v. Ryder Truck
Rental Inc.
49. Sebetic v. Hagerty
50. Sioux City Police Officers'
Ass'n v. Sioux City
51. Slohoda v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc.
52. Southwestern Cmty. Action
Council v. Cmty. Servs. Admin.
53. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.
54. St. Petersburg Motor Club
v. Cook
55. State Div. of Human Rights v.
Vill. of Spencerport
56. Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc.
57. Thompson v. Bd. of Trs.,
Sch. Dist. No. 12
58. Thomson v. Sanborn's
Motor Express, Inc.
59. Townshend v. Bd. of Educ.
60. Tuck v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.
61. Voichahoske v. City of
Grand Island
62. Waggoner v. Ace
Hardware Corp.
63. Wagher v. Guy's Foods,
Inc.
64. Wash. Water Power Co. v.
Wash. State Human Rights
Comm' n
65. Waters v. Gaston County
66. Whirlpool Corp. v. Civil
Rights Comm'n
67. Winrick v. City of Warren
68. Wright v. Metrohealth
Med. Ctr.
69. Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co.

357 N.Y.S.2d 245 (App. Div. 1974).
596 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
640 F. Supp. 1274 (E.D. Wis. 1986).
495 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1993).
475 A.2d 618 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1984).
462 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. W. Va. 1978).
444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
567 So. 2d 488 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
434 N.Y.S.2d 52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
814 F.2d 1506 (10th Cir. 1987).
627 P.2d 1229 (Mont. 1981).
382 A.2d 53 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977).
396 S.E.2d 185 (W. Va. 1990).
421 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
231 N.W.2d 124 (Neb. 1975).
953 P.2d 88 (Wash. 1998).
885 P.2d 1197 (Kan. 1994).
586 P.2d 1149 (Wash. 1978).

57 F.3d 422 (4th Cir. 1995).
390 N.W.2d 625 (Mich. 1986).
299 N.W.2d 27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
58 F.3d 1130 (6th Cir. 1995).
562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977).
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